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1 Introduction
Since the seminal papers by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore
(1990),1 a vast literature using the property rights approach has emerged to
examine the effect of asset ownership on the firm’s investment decisions.2 The
present paper differs from the other papers in two aspects. First, the focus here
is on the firm’s decision between a general or specific investment. A software
company can write a generic human resource management software that works
for all firms, or write a tailor-made one for a particular firm. Likewise, a young
worker may contemplate earning an MBA (general investment) or earning an
MSc in Financial Engineering (specific investment). A frequent decision as it
is, the choice between a general or a specific investment is somewhat neglected
in the literature.
Second, this paper studies one firm’s investment decision together with
the decisions of all other firms in the market. More specifically, we study a
two-sided market with pairwise production and each pair involving one seller
and one buyer. Suppose seller A and buyer B plan to work together. In this
case, they do not need to cooperate or trade with seller C; nor will seller C’s
investment affect the value that A and B jointly produce. Nonetheless, seller
A is concerned about seller C’s investment because it serves as an outside
option for buyer B, affecting seller A’s ex post bargaining payoff as well as
her investment incentive. Likewise, seller C’s investment decision is affected
by seller A’s decision, not to mention the decisions by other parties. This is
in contrast with the standard Grossman-Hart-Moore (hereafter, GHM) frame-
work, in which the focus is usually is on seller A and buyer B, while their
respective outside options are exogenously given. The strategic interaction
between the two firms and their alternative trading partners is thus ignored
in their framework.
In our two-sided market, we assume that only sellers make investments
and the choices are between specific investments and general investments. The
specific investment produces a high value when the buyer for whom the invest-
ment is made is involved, but it produces a zero value otherwise; the general
investment produces a low value whichever buyer is involved. There are two
types of assets: the seller’s asset and the buyer’s asset. A seller and a buyer
1For a nontechnical introduction to the approach, see Hart (1995).
2See, e.g., Chiu (1998), Dasgupta and Tao (2000), de Meza and Lockwood (1998a,b),
and Rajan and Zingales (1998).
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need to have access to both of the assets in order to produce. We assume the
standard GHM setting otherwise. The asset ownership is given at the outset
and remains unchanged in the exercise. In stage 1 of the game, sellers make
observable but unverifiable investment choices. In stage 2, sellers and buyers
bargain, followed by production and surplus division.
This paper highlights the importance of an individual’s asset ownership
and market environment in which that individual is situated in determining
his/her investment decision. The basic insight of our main results is illustrated
by the small market depicted in Figure 1. Each agent is referred to by a name,
while his/her asset ownership is indicated in parentheses (as and ab denote
the seller’s asset and the buyer’s asset, respectively). First consider Sarah’s
investment problem. By making a specific investment, she restricts the set
of potential buyers to a single agent — the buyer for whom the investment
is made, say Bill; in the bilateral monopoly between them, the most she can
get from ex post bargaining is one half of the production value. By making
a general investment, she is ensured of a price nearly equal to its production
value; the reason is that, since buyers outnumber sellers, there is excess demand
for sellers as partners. Therefore, as long as the (net-of-cost) production value
of a specific investment less than doubles that of a general investment, Sarah
will choose the general investment. By a similar argument, foreseeing Sarah’s
decision, Sophie will also choose the general investment.
Sellers Buyers
{Sarah,as,ab} Ben
{Sophie,as} {Bill,ab}
{Billy,ab}
Sue {Bob,as,ab}
Figure 1: A small market with three sellers and four buyers
Sue’s situation is different, however. Hampered by her lack of any assets,
Sue cannot exploit the advantage of excess competition on the buyers’ side
and can work only with Bob. Bob does not want to compete against the
other buyers for partnership with Sarah or Sophie as there are already too
many buyers competing for partnerships with them. This leads to a bilateral
monopoly between Sue and Bob; whatever Sue’s investment is, they will share
2
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the surplus equally. As long as the specific investment is the efficient invest-
ment, Sue will always choose it. While owning more assets de-motivates Sarah
and Sophie, paradoxically, owning no assets at all motivates Sue to make the
efficient choice.
Note that this adverse effect of asset ownership need not occur in another
market environment. This again can be illustrated using Figure 1, with the
modification that Billy and his asset are now absent from the scene so that
there are equal numbers of sellers and buyers. In this case, absent the excess
competition among buyers, Sarah and Sophie always find it optimal to make
specific investments so long as these investments are efficient. In this case,
asset ownership does not impair the investment incentive.
In this paper, we formalize the above ideas and show that they hold in
more complicated market environments, where one challenging task is to de-
fine “market environment” or “excess competition” operationally. Our adverse
effect of ownership generalizes related results in Chiu (1998) and de Meza and
Lockwood (1998). These papers differ from GHM in the bargaining solution
used (the outside option principle is used), but conform with it in the ex-
ogeneity of outside option. In the current paper, we differ from GHM also
in how the outside option is determined. Through the endogenization of the
outside option, we obtain new insight on the effect of market competition on
the incentive role of ownership. To better relate to previous results, we also
study a variant model in which the investment choice is the level of investment.
We find that the adverse effect is not as likely as under the investment type
problem, suggesting that the actual adverse effect of ownership is more serious
than it is predicted by Chiu and de Meza and Lockwood.
Two remarks about our framework are in order. Firstly, our paper does not
have anything to say about the initial distribution of assets, except to compare
different initial allocations. This is in common with the existing literature
except for the interesting paper by Gans (2005). One might think of a random
initial allocation depending on chance and historical events outside the model
and then compare ex post allocations for efficiency. Secondly, we assume that
sellers and buyers do not contract before sellers choose investments. Sellers
know all preferences and characteristics of all potential buyers prior to their
investment decisions, and there is no market friction that prevents sellers from
meeting and negotiating with the buyers for whom specific investments are
made.3
3An example of this environment is the following: Suppose person A has as an asset a
search engine software programme for rare books she developed for a school project. She can
invest in tailoring this software to meet the needs of academic buyers interested in rare books
or to meet the needs of bookstores that desire to know the kinds of books popular among
3
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A few recent papers are related to our work. de Meza and Lockwood
(1998b) study investment decisions in a general equilibrium framework that
allows repeated production as well as births and deaths of agents. They assume
that the agents are atomistic and non-pivotal. In our work, we study one-shot
investments in a thin market with non-atomistic agents. Ramey and Watson
(2001) study the effects of market frictions in a dynamic matching model with
match-specific investments and effort choices to maintain the productivity of
the assets. Unlike our model, they assume market friction, represented by
the probability of being rematched, in determining which seller a buyer will
be able to contact. In any match, the worst punishment for shirking is to
sever the relationship. Thus, a frictionless market could have adverse effects
on incentives. Moreover, Ramey and Watson do not study the problem of the
type of investment as we do here.
Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (2001) and Felli and Roberts (2000) inves-
tigate to what extent, in the absence of sophisticated contracts, the holdup
problem between sellers and buyers can be mitigated through the market. The
former paper focuses on the use of assortative matching, while the latter uses
Bertrand competition. Unlike the present paper, neither of these papers an-
alyzes the role of ownership in enhancing efficiency. Bolton and Xu (1999)
construct a two-firm model to investigate the interaction between managerial
market competition (both within and across firms) and ownership of firms.
The firms in their model can consist of more than two agents, which allows
the authors to compare the performance of a richer set of ownership struc-
tures. Grossman and Helpman (2002) construct a general equilibrium model
where the market structure is endogenized and study the optimality of the
equilibrium outcome. Atomistic and non-pivotal agents are assumed in their
model. In all of these papers, the main focus is on the choice of investment
level, instead of on the investment type.4 Finally, in a sequel (Chatterjee and
Chiu, 2006) to this paper, we address a different kind of market friction, one
arising from commitments made as a result of the bargaining institution, and
include choices on the flexibility of investment and the level of investment in
characterizing the optimal ownership structure.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 introduces the concept of the efficient supply of general investments,
different categories of buyers. She knows both types of buyer are out there in the real world
and she can go out and talk with them about her software, but she realizes that she cannot
convince them that she has something useful until she undertakes the investment. In another
example, in the labor market, individuals decide whether to earn an MBA (generalist) or an
MS in computational finance (specialist) without pre-contracting with potential employers.
4See also Kranton and Minehart (2000)
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allowing our bargaining solution and its justifications to be presented in Sec-
tion 4. Section 5 studies the investment choice given the bargaining solution.
Section 6 provides two extensions, one assuming noninvesting yet productive
sellers, the other involving choices of investment levels. Section 7 offers some
concluding remarks.
2 The Model
We consider a two-sided market with pairwise production, each pair involving
one seller and one buyer. The set of sellers and the set of buyers are denoted
by S and B, respectively. There are two types of assets: the seller’s asset
and the buyer’s asset, denoted by as and ab, respectively. They are important
because each pair of seller and buyer needs to have access to both assets for
the production to take place; we assume exclusive use of assets so that each
single asset can only be used by a seller and buyer pair. Only the seller makes
an investment — in her human capital — and the investment choice is between
a general investment and a specific investment. Both types of investment
require the same cost, c > 0. Provided that the required assets are available,
a general investment yields a value of m > 0 whichever buyer is involved;
a specific investment yields a value of M > m > M/2 when the buyer for
whom the investment is made is involved, but a value of zero otherwise. To
be economically interesting, we assume that m/2− c > 0.
As is standard in the property rights literature, we assume that asset owner-
ship is exogenously given and remains unchanged in the exercise. To facilitate
the discussion, we partition the set of sellers, S, into three subsets: S1, S2,
and S3. S1 consists of those sellers each of whom has a pair of as and ab; S2
consists of those sellers each of whom has a piece of as; and S3 consists of those
sellers who own no assets. Similarly, we partition the set of buyers, B, into
three subsets: B1, B2, and B3. B1 consists of those buyers who own no assets;
B2 consists of those buyers each of whom has a piece of ab; and B3 consists of
those buyers each of whom owns a pair of as and ab. We do not consider any
other ownership structures, such as a buyer owning one piece of as or a seller
owning two pieces of as, etc. Players in subsets Si and Bi are called type i
players and their ownership structures are called type i ownership structures,
where i = 1, 2, 3.
Given the ownership configuration, sellers and buyers engage in a two-
stage game. In stage 1, sellers choose investments. By incurring a cost of
c > 0, each seller can make either a general investment or a specific investment;
investments are observable but not verifiable. In stage 2, sellers and buyers
5
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bargain on with whom to form a pair and at what price. As is standard in the
property rights literature, bargaining at this stage is contractible, investments
are non-resalable, and any agreement reached will be implemented accordingly.
There is no discounting; the structure and payoffs of the game are commonly
known.
Before we end this Section, it is important to note the varying power be-
stowed by asset ownership to agents in choosing their trading partners. Since a
pair of as and ab are required for a seller and a buyer to engage in production,
a seller in Si can only be matched with some buyer in Bj where j ≥ i; in other
words, a buyer in Bj finds investments by sellers useful only when the sellers
come from Si where i ≤ j. The power of a seller in Si is decreasing in i while
the power of a buyer in Bi is increasing in i; here, power is defined as the
ability to match to a larger set of partners. To illustrate this point, in Figure
1, Sarah — the seller in S1 — can make an investment useful to Ben, Billy, or
Bob; on the other hand, Sue — the seller in S3 — can make an investment useful
only to Bob, but not to Ben or Billy. This is the key to understanding the
results of this paper.
3 Efficient Allocation and Excess Supply
The game is solved by backward induction. Before going into details about
the bargaining process in stage 2, we first introduce some auxiliary notation
to describe succinctly the sellers’ investment choices in stage 1. We classify
sellers in Si, i = 1, 2, 3, into different groups depending on their investment
choices. Si1 contains those in S
i who made a general investment. Si2 contains
those who made a specific investment for some buyer in Bl, l ≥ i and for
this buyer no other seller in Sr, r ≤ l has the same investment. Si3 contains
those who made a specific investment for some buyer in Bl, l ≥ i while for this
buyer some other seller in Sr, r ≤ l has made the same investment. The specific
investments made by sellers in Si2 are nonduplicated, in contrast to those made
by sellers in Si3, which are duplicated. Finally, we define S
i
0 to contain those
sellers who made no investment at all and Si4 to contain those who made a
specific investment but not specific to anybody in Bl, l ≥ i. Clearly, sellers in
Si0 and S
i
4 will play no role in the bargaining, either because they have made
no investments at all or because no buyers exist who, together with the seller,
have the required access to as and ab for production. (Since members in Si0
and Si4 play no role in the bargaining and consequently get a zero payoff in the
bargaining process, we do not explicitly specify their payoffs in the description
of the bargaining solution.) Clearly, Si = ∪4j=0Sij and Sij ∩ Sik = φ for j 6= k.
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Definition 1 We call the investments made by sellers in Si2, S
i
3, and S
i
4 the
nonduplicated investments, the duplicated investments, and the useless invest-
ments, respectively, where i = 1, 2, 3.
Similarly, we have a partition of buyers in Bi, i = 1, 2, 3. Bi1 contains those
buyers in Bi for whom no seller in Sr, r ≤ i has made specific investments; Bi2
contains those buyers for whom there is only one seller in ∪r≤iSr who has made
a specific investment; Bi3 contains those buyers for whom there are more than
one seller in ∪r≤iSr who has made specific investments. Clearly, Bi = ∪3j=1Bij
and Bij ∩Bik = φ for j 6= k.
There is an interesting property from the partitioning of Si and Bi, i =
1, 2, 3: regardless of the investment choices in stage 1 of the game, there is a
one-to-one onto mapping from ∪iSi2 to ∪iBi2 and we must have
3X
i=1
|Si2| =
3X
i=1
|Bi2|, (1)
i.e., the number of sellers who have made nonduplicated investments equals
the number of buyers for whom nonduplicated investments have been made.
3.1 Excess Supply of General Investment
In the property rights literature, the bargaining stage is always assumed to be
efficient. (To ease the discussion, we may use “a seller selling her investment
to a buyer” or “assigning a seller’s investment to a buyer” to refer to the
formation of a pair for production between the seller and the buyer.) In our
context, given the investment decisions, an efficient allocation can be easily
characterized here: For each nonduplicated investment, give it to the buyer for
whom it is specific; for each kind of duplicated investments, give one unit to the
buyer for whom it is specific; finally, the number of general investments being
assigned should be maximized subject to the asset ownership constraints.
Despite possible multiplicity of efficient allocations, we now provide some
characterization that is invariant for all efficient allocations given investment
choices. We first consider a thought experiment in which investments are
allocated efficiently subject to general investments being traded among each
type of firms. Define ∆i ≡ |Si1| − |Bi1|, which we call the constrained excess
supply of general investment faced by type i firms, i = 1, 2, 3. The following
must hold in this thought experiment. (i) In case∆i > 0 (excess supply), while
every buyer in Bi1 obtains a general investment, there are ∆
i sellers in Si1 who
are unable to have their general investments allocated; (ii) in case ∆i = 0
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(market clearing), every buyer in Bi1 obtains a general investment and every
seller in Si1 has her general investment allocated; (iii) in case ∆
i < 0 (excess
demand), while every seller in Si1 has her general investment allocated, there
are |∆i| buyers in Bi1 who are unable to obtain a general investment. In other
words, once we know ∆i, we can say concretely what will happen to buyers
and sellers in Bi1 and S
i
1.
Building on this, we now construct a general index Ei that answers similar
questions when general investments are not restricted within the same type
of firms. To fix the idea, consider the problem from the perspective of type 2
firms and suppose ∆2 is positive. Once across-type allocation is allowed, this
excess supply faced by type 2 firms may be, on the one hand, alleviated by
a negative ∆3 (since buyers in B31 not receiving general investments from S
3
1
may want to acquire them from S21) and, on the other hand, worsened by a
positive ∆1 (since sellers in S11 unable to sell general investments to B
1
1 now
compete with sellers in S21). Taking into account the restrictions of feasible
trade imposed by asset ownership, we come to conclude that, to evaluate type
2 firms’ position fully, the correct index to use is
E2 ≡ max{0,∆1}+∆2 +min{0,∆3}, (2)
which we call the (unconstrained) excess supply of general investments faced
by type 2 firms.5
The index has interesting implications. If E2 = 0 (market clearing), in any
efficient allocation, every seller in S21 , as well as every more endowed seller in
S11 , has her general investment allocated, while every buyer in B
2
1 , as well as
every more endowed buyer in B31 , is allocated a general investment. If E
2 > 0
(excess supply), buyers in B21 (a fortiori, more endowed buyers in B
3
1) are
in a favorable position. In any efficient allocation, every buyer in B21∪ B31
is allocated a general investment, but some seller in ∪3j=1Sj1 must have her
general investment unallocated. Moreover, there exists an efficient allocation
in which there are exactly E2 sellers in S11 ∪S21 with their general investments
unallocated. If E2 < 0 (excess demand), sellers in S21 (a fortiori, more endowed
5The max{} and min{} reflect the varying power bestowed by asset ownership to agents
in choosing their trading partners—the key insight in the analysis of the paper. Since sellers
in S31 are unable to compete with sellers in S
2
1 in selling to B
2
1 , excess supply for general
investment among type 3 firms (∆3 > 0) will not worsen the position of sellers in S21 . This
accounts for the use of min{0,∆3} instead of ∆3. Likewise, due to the lack of assets, buyers
in B11 will never be interested in acquiring general investments from sellers in S
2
1 . Hence,
an excess demand for general investments among type 1 firms (∆1 > 0) will not improve
the position experienced by sellers in S21 . This accounts for the use of max{0,∆1} instead
of ∆1.
8
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Vol. 7 [2007], Iss. 1 (Topics), Art. 27
Brought to you by | University of Hong Kong Libraries
Authenticated
Download Date | 11/11/14 10:10 AM
sellers in S11) are in a favorable position. In this case, in any efficient allocation,
every seller in S11 ∪S21 has her general investment allocated, while some buyer
in ∪3j=1Bj1 is not allocated a general investment. Moreover, there exists an
efficient allocation in which there are exactly |E2| buyers in B21 ∪ B31 without
general investments unallocated.
These implications are illustrated in the following examples, where a 6-
tuple [|S11 | , |S21 | , |S31 | ; |B11 | , |B21 | , |B31 |] is used to represent the general invest-
ment choices made.
Example 1 Consider an environment [2,1,0;0,1,1] such that E2 = 1 > 0.
Then, in any efficient allocation, both buyers in B21 ∪ B31 are allocated the
general investment, and exactly one seller in S11 ∪ S21 has her investment un-
allocated.
Example 2 Consider an environment [1,1,0;2,1,1] such that E2 = −1 < 0.
Then in any efficient allocation, both sellers in S11 ∪ S21 have their investment
allocated, and some buyer in ∪3j=1Bj1 is not allocated a general investment.
Moreover, in those efficient allocations in which the investment from S11 is
assigned to B11, one buyer in B
2
1 ∪B31 is not allocated a general investment.6
In general, we can define Ei, i = 1, 2, 3 to measure the excess supply of
general investments faced by type i firms. Essentially, it is the sum ∆1 +
∆2 +∆3 with modification, taking into account the effect of asset ownership
in constraining the choice of trading partners. Specifically, we define
E1 ≡ ∆1 +min{0,∆2 +min{0,∆3}}, (3)
and E3 ≡ max{0,max{0,∆1}+∆2}+∆3 (4)
as the excess supply of general investments faced by type i firms, i = 1, 3.
(The nested min{} and max{} again reflect constraints from asset ownership
on agents in their choice of trading partners.) We establish the following
general result (all proofs of lemma and propositions, unless otherwise stated,
are relegated to the Appendix):
6Note that no buyer in B21 ∪ B31 is unallocated in the efficient allocation in which the
investment from S11 is given to B
3
1 and that from S
2
1 is given to B
2
1 . Thus, it is erroneous
to claim that, in any efficient allocation, somebody in B21 ∪B31 must be unallocated.
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Lemma 1 Given any market structure and given any investment decisions.
The following are true, for i = 1, 2, 3:
1. (Excess supply) Suppose Ei > 0. For all efficient allocations, some seller
in ∪3j=1Sj1 has her general investment unallocated and every buyer in
∪j≥iBj1 is allocated a general investment. In addition, there exists an
efficient allocation in which the number of sellers in ∪j≤iSj1 with their
general investments unallocated is exactly equal to E2.
2. (Market clearing) Suppose Ei = 0. For all efficient allocations, every
seller in ∪j≤iSj1 must have her general investment allocated and every
buyer in ∪j≥iBj1 is allocated a general investment.
3. (Excess demand) Suppose Ei < 0. For all efficient allocations, every
seller in ∪j≤iSj1 has her general investment allocated and some buyer
in ∪3j=1Bj1 is not allocated with a general investment. There exists an
efficient allocation in which the number of buyers in ∪j≥iBj1 without their
general investments allocated is exactly equal to |E2|.
A remark is in order here. Despite multiple feasible allocations, if we insist
that allocations be in the core, then all efficient allocations must be payoff
equivalent. For instance, if E2 > 0 such that some seller in S11 ∪ S21 has her
general investment unallocated and receives a zero payment in one efficient
allocation, then that seller must also receive the same zero payment in all
efficient allocations. Core allocation also implies that any seller equally or less
endowed must also receive zero payments in all efficient allocations.
4 Bargaining
Our bargaining solution consists of two components: that the allocation of
investments is efficient, and that the transfers satisfy the following scheme, for
i = 1, 2, 3:
1. Players who neither give out nor receive any investment receive a zero
price.
2. Buyers in Bi3 who receive a duplicated investment pay the same price,
pi3 = 0, to the respective sellers.
3. Buyers in Bi1 who receive a general investment pay the same price, p
i
1,
to the respective sellers.
10
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4. Buyers inBi2 who receive a nonduplicated investment pay the same price,
pi2, to the respective sellers.
5. pi1 and p
i
2 are given in the following table.
Ei pi1 p
i
2
= 0 m/2 M/2
< 0 m M/2
> 0 0 M −m
Table 1: The price table
Properties 1 to 3 are requirements of the outcome being in the core: any
violation of them will move the outcome away from the core. Property 4
is a symmetry property that we find appealing. Property 5 deserves more
explanation. According to the table, the price of general investments will be
driven up tom or down to zero to clear the market in case of excess demand or
excess supply. This is simply an implication of the core allocation. In the case
of market clearing, the ex post surplus of a general investment, m, is equally
split between the seller and the buyer. This can be seen as a generalization of
the Nash bargaining outcome (Nash 1950; Rubinstein 1982).
For nonduplicated investments, the prices follow the outside option prin-
ciple in noncooperative bargaining theory: The buyer will obtain half of the
surplus from bargaining when his outside option is nonbinding and will obtain
a value exactly equal to his outside option otherwise. In case Ei = 0 or Ei < 0,
the price of a general investment is m/2 or m, respectively. For a buyer in
Bi2, acquiring a general investment (his outside option) brings him a gain of
m/2 or zero, which is strictly less than an equal split of the surplus from the
nonduplicated investment, M . In this case, the outside option is nonbinding
and the price at which the nonduplicated investment is traded is simply M/2.
On the other hand, in the case of Ei > 0, the price of a general investment is
zero. Acquiring a general investment (his outside option) brings the buyer a
gain of m > M/2. In this case, the outside option is binding. To maintain the
buyer’s gain of m, the price at which the nonduplicated investment is traded
is simply M −m.7
Remark 1 It is routine to check that E1 ≤ E2 ≤ E3 for all ∆1,∆2, and ∆3.
This implies that p11 ≥ p21 ≥ p31 for all ∆1,∆2, and ∆3.
7See Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) and Sutton (1986) for the outside option
principle: and see Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton (1989) for experimental support of the
principle.
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Remark 1 indicates how asset ownership empowers sellers to match with
a large group of potential buyers: sellers in Si can only sell their investments
to Bj, where j ≥ i. Hence, the general investments from type 1 sellers cannot
be cheaper than those from type 2 sellers; in turn, those general investments
from type 2 sellers cannot be cheaper than those from type 3 sellers.
4.1 Justifications for the Bargaining Solution
We have proposed to use a bargaining solution characterized by efficient al-
location together with the five properties regarding prices. Note that since
our bargaining solution prescribes that all players on the long side receive a
zero payoff, this rules out collusion among sellers or among buyers. This is
justifiable because any such collusion is not immune to deviation. In fact, any
allocation that is in the core must have the property that players on the long
side receive a zero payoff. The following Lemma is easy to prove.
Lemma 2 1. The allocation resulting from our bargaining solution is in
the core.
2. If an allocation is in the core, then the following must hold true:
(a) efficient matching, i.e., matching is such that social welfare is max-
imized.
(b) for Ei > 0, pi1 = 0, i = 1, 2, 3.
(c) for Ei < 0, pi1 = m, i = 1, 2, 3.
(d) pi3 = 0, i = 1, 2, 3.
(e) pi1 = 0⇒ pi2 ≤M −m.
Two less controversial properties are used to arrive at our bargaining solu-
tion: namely (i) the surplus is split equally when the outside option is nonbind-
ing, and (ii) the payoff a player receives from a bilateral relationship simply
matches his/her outside option if the outside option is binding; these two
properties can also be summarized as Nash equilibrium with outside options
as constraints. Since requiring that the bargaining solution be in the core is
fairly legitimate, we think the bargaining solution reasonable.
Our bargaining solution is a limiting equilibrium in a generalized alternat-
ing bargaining game a la Rubinstein and Chatterjee and Dutta (1998). Stage 2
of our game — the bargaining stage — consists of an infinite number of substages
12
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Vol. 7 [2007], Iss. 1 (Topics), Art. 27
Brought to you by | University of Hong Kong Libraries
Authenticated
Download Date | 11/11/14 10:10 AM
in which sellers and buyers alternate in making proposals.8 Those responders
who accept offers, together with the respective proposers, will disappear from
the bargaining game. The remaining players will proceed to the next substage
with their roles of proposers and responders switched. The process contin-
ues until all potentially beneficial trades are exhausted. The proof that this
game yields our bargaining solution as a limiting outcome is relegated to the
Appendix.
5 Investment Decisions
We now study the investment game using the bargaining solution previously
stipulated. We first note the following result (proof omitted):
Lemma 3 In any equilibrium, (1) |Si3| = |Si4| = |Bi3| = 0 for all i; (2) Ei ≤ 0
for all i.
Part (1) is straightforward: the seller would not choose to invest duplicated
investments or useless investments; otherwise, she would not be able to recoup
the investment cost. Part (2) says that the case when excess supply of general
investment will not result; otherwise, some seller with a general investment
must receive a zero price and will be unable to recoup the investment cost.
In the first two subsections that follow, we make an additional assumption
that |Si| = |Bi| for i = 1, 3. Simplifying as it is, this assumption has a natural
interpretation. Each pair of type 1 seller and type 1 buyer can be construed
as an integrated firm with the seller as the employer and the buyer as the
employee; each pair of type 3 seller and type 2 buyer can be construed as an
integrated firm with the buyer as the employer and the seller as the employee.
This assumption has an interesting implication: the difference in the number
of sellers and the number of buyers is reflected by the difference in the number
of type 2 sellers and buyers: |S|− |B| = |S2|− |B2|.
Given the additional assumption, the investment decisions depend on the
ownership and competition in a neat way.
8We assume that each offer is publicly announced and available to any responder at the
same, nonpreferential price. This restriction is made to simplify the exposition, but there
is no particular reason why offers cannot have other properties. We conjecture that the
equilibrium outcome that we are interested in survives the relaxation that private offers are
allowed.
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5.1 Excess Competition among Sellers (|S| ≥ |B|)
In this subsection, we look at the scenario in which the number of sellers is
greater than or equal to the number of buyers, |S| ≥ |B|. The following
proposition is easy to show (proof omitted).
Proposition 1 Suppose that |S| ≥ |B|. The following prescribes an equilib-
rium outcome:
1. All type 1 sellers (sellers in S1) make nonduplicated investments specific
for some type 1 buyer.
2. A total of |B2| type 2 sellers (sellers in S2) make nonduplicated invest-
ments specific for some type 2 buyer.
3. All type 3 sellers (sellers in S3) make nonduplicated investments specific
for some type 3 buyer.
In this equilibrium, ownership does not play any role in affecting the seller’s
investment decision; regardless of her asset ownership, the seller always chooses
a specific investment whenever investing. The intuition is that there is strong
enough competition among sellers in relation to buyers to force sellers to make
specific investments when investing.
It is easy to check that the above prescription constitutes an equilibrium.
Given their investment decisions, those sellers who made a general investment
can sell at m/2 and those who made a nonduplicated investment can sell at
M/2. If some seller sj ∈ Sj prescribed to make a nonduplicated investment
unilaterally deviates to make a general investment, then both
¯
Sj1
¯
and
¯
Bj1
¯
increase by one without changing the fact that Ei = 0 for all i. As a conse-
quence, the deviating seller receives just m/2 from bargaining, which is less
than what she would receive under no deviation. Other deviations such as
no investment at all, duplicated investment, or specific investment are clearly
unattractive.
For any seller in S2 prescribed not to make an investment, unilaterally
deviating to choose a general investment leads to excess supply (E2 = E3 = 1)
such that she will get a zero price from her investment and will be unable to
recoup the investment cost. If the seller chooses specific investment instead, the
investment must be duplicated and unprofitable. Therefore, the prescription
in the Proposition must constitute an equilibrium.
While Proposition 1 describes one equilibrium, we next argue that the
main message of the Proposition that only specific investments are chosen and
ownership does not play a role is in fact invariant for all equilibria of the game.
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Proposition 2 Suppose that |S| ≥ |B|. In every equilibrium outcome of the
investment game, only |B| nonduplicated specific investments are made and no
general investments are made.
The crucial thing to notice is that there are more sellers than buyers.
Under any (pure strategy) equilibrium, there must be just |B| sellers who
would invest. Therefore, in the bargaining stage, the number of sellers who
have invested is equal to the number of buyers who want to buy. This leads to
an equal split of the surplus and the benefit of investing a general investment is
thus lower than that of a specific investment, so long as the seller has decided
to invest. Technically speaking, in all equilibria, we have Ei = 0 and ∆i = 0
for all i.
The proposition also points out two kinds of indeterminacy in the game. In
the first kind, one seller makes and sells her specific investment to a different
buyer in the two equilibria. This indeterminacy is payoff irrelevant because
each party’s payoff does not vary across two equilibria. In the second kind,
the number of independent sellers that make and sell specific investments is
different from one equilibrium to the other, as is the number of type 3 sellers
that make and sell specific investments. Therefore, when all equilibria are
likely ex ante, absence of ownership renders the seller owning fewer assets to
have a smaller probability of trade.
5.2 Excess Competition among Buyers (|S| < |B|)
We now study the opposite case when |S| < |B|. In contrast to the previous
case, ownership matters but in a way different from Hart and Moore’s general
insight which argues that assigning more assets to an agent gives the agent a
more appropriate incentive to invest.
Proposition 3 Suppose that |S| < |B|. Every equilibrium of the game has the
following properties:
1. All type 1 sellers (sellers in S1) make a general investment.
2. All type 2 sellers (sellers in S2) make a general investment.
3. All type 3 sellers (sellers in S3) make a nonduplicated investment (spe-
cific for some type 3 buyer (buyer in B3)).
In this scenario, only type 3 sellers — investors with the fewest assets —
will have the appropriate incentive to choose specific investments; all other
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sellers choose the inefficient general investment. This result holds true for all
equilibria of the game. The Proposition can be illustrated by Figure 1. In
equilibrium, both Sarah and Sophie make general investments for m while Sue
makes a specific investment for Bob forM/2. Sarah and Sophie can extract all
the surpluses from their general investments because three buyers—Ben, Bill
and Billy—compete for their general investments. Sue cannot emulate Sarah
and Sophie because of her lack of assets. She can only trade her investment
with Bob, and making a specific investment for Bob is therefore the best choice
for her.
Consider a general problem in which |S| < |B|. Regardless of the sellers’
investments, there must be buyers in B1 ∪ B2 who end up not having any
investment. As a consequence, the equilibrium price of a general investment
will be driven up to m, while the equilibrium price of a nonduplicated specific
investment is still M/2, reflecting the bilateral monopoly between the seller
and the buyer. Since any seller s1 ∈ S1 is eligible to sell to any buyer inB1∪B2,
she is guaranteed a price of m for a general investment and a price of M/2 at
most for a specific investment. To choose the general investment is indeed s1’s
dominant strategy. Given that all sellers in S1 choose the general investment,
the same logic argues that all sellers in S2 also have the general investment
as their dominant strategy. The excess demand is the crucial reason for why
both S1 and S2 make general investments in any equilibrium here, but do not
in Propositions 1 and 2 with |B| ≤ |S|. The general lesson found in Hart and
Moore that asset ownership enhances the asset owner’s incentive to make more
appropriate investments does not hold in this context.
The above analysis points out that the driving force for the inefficiency
in the market is that sellers take advantage of the excess competition among
buyers. To restore efficiency, sellers should refrain from taking advantage of the
competition. Type 3 sellers have to refrain from doing so because, lacking any
assets, they can bargain and trade only with buyers in B3 and not with buyers
in B1 or B2. The excess competition among buyers is therefore eliminated.
5.3 A Generalized Framework
Thus far, we have restricted our attention to the case when |Si| = |Bi| for
i = 1, 3.9 We now plan to relax this assumption. Figure 2 depicts a market
in which there are one type 1 seller (Sarah) and two type 1 buyers (Ben and
Bill).
9We still make the following restrictions: (1) each player cannot own more than one as
and one ab; (2) a seller cannot own one unit of ab only; and (3) a buyer cannot own one
unit of as only.
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Type of Firms Sellers Buyers
1st {Sarah,as,ab} Ben
1st Bill
2nd {Sophie,as} {Billy,ab}
2nd {Stephanie,as}
3rd Sue {Bob,as,ab}
Figure 2: A small market in which |S1| 6= |B1|
Once the assumption of |Si| = |Bi| for i = 1, 3 is relaxed, it is not that easy
to characterize the market by a single number or a single relationship (such as
whether or not |S| ≥ |B|) of which the equilibrium investment pattern can be
made a function. It turns out that a notion parallel that of excess supply of
general investments is very useful in summarizing the new results here. Define
e1 ≡ d1 +min{0, d2 +min{0, d3}}
e2 ≡ max{0, d1}+ d2 +min{0, d3}
and e3 ≡ max{0,max{0, d1}+ d2}+ d3,
where di = |Si|− |Bi| , i = 1, 2, 3.
The interpretation of these terms is very similar to that of Ei, despite the
fact that the former are pre-investment market characteristics while the latter
are post-investment ones. Essentially, ei indicates whether or not there are
more sellers competing with a seller in Si than buyers competing with a buyer
in Bi when taking asset ownership into account. When ei > 0 (ei < 0), there
are more (fewer) sellers competing with a type i seller than buyers competing
with a type i buyer; when ei = 0, the number of sellers competing with a type
i seller equals the number of buyers competing with a type i buyer. As an
illustration, consider the following situation: ∆1 = 4, ∆2 = 2, and ∆3 = −3
and, accordingly, e2 > 3. In this case, two sellers in S2 have to compete with
four sellers in S1 to sell to three buyers in B3. Since investments that can be
successfully sold cannot outnumber buyers, some seller from S2 or her rival
from Si, i 6= 2, is bound to have no trade. The predicament faced by “some
seller in S21” is not limited to a specific seller–it is perceived equally by every
seller in S21 . On the other hand, buyers in B
2
1 are in so favorable a position
that each is certain to get an investment in equilibrium.10
10Like the case of Ei, the max{.} and min{.} simply reflect constraints imposed on agents
by asset ownership on their trading opportunities. Consider the case d1 = 4, d2 = 2, and
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We present the following results that generalize the previous results.
Proposition 4 1. In any equilibrium sellers of the same ownership type
must have the same type of investment (specific versus general), as long
as they invest.
2. If some seller in Si makes a specific investment, then any seller in Si+1
who invests must make a specific investment too, where i = 1, 2.
3. If ei ≥ 0, every investing seller in Si makes a nonduplicated specific
investment, i = 1, 2, 3.
4. If ei < 0, every investing seller in Si makes a general investment, i =
1, 2, 3.
There are two points worth noting here. First, sellers without any assets
are more likely to make specific investments than are sellers with as, who
in turn are more likely to make specific investments than are sellers with
both types of assets. The basic insight on the adverse effect of ownership
highlighted in the last section continues to hold in the more general setting. In
fact, the first two results of the above Proposition mean that only the following
four possibilities of investment choices (as long as sellers invest) are feasible
equilibrium outcomes (Table 2):
outcome S1 S2 S3
(i) general general general
(ii) general general specific
(iii) general specific specific
(iv) specific specific specific
Table 2: Equilibrium investment decisions
Second, the notion of excess competition is extended and is captured by an
index, ei, i = 1, 2, 3. It is straightforward to show that e1 ≤ e2 ≤ e3, which is
d3 = 0, in which two extra sellers from S21 need buyers. Since the buyers in B
1
1 are unable
to utilize investments supplied by S2, a negative d1 will be treated as if it were a zero d1
in determining e2. Although some four buyers in B1 are bound to receive no investments
from S1, they are unable to utilize those from S2, hence not mitigating S2’s excess supply
problem.
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reminiscent of Remark 1 that says that E1 ≤ E2 ≤ E3. Result 3 of Proposition
4 states that, in case of e1 > 0 (excess supply), type 1 sellers will take advantage
of the excess supply and will make general investments. Sellers with fewer
assets may make general or specific investments with the restrictions imposed
by Results 1 and 2. The admissible equilibrium outcomes in this case are
outcomes (i) to (iii), but not (iv). Numerical examples exhibiting these three
types of outcomes can be constructed. In the absence of excess competition on
the buyers’ side, according to Result 4 of the proposition, there must be some
seller making a specific investment. In this case, the admissible equilibrium
outcomes are outcomes (ii) to (iv), but not (i). Numeric examples exhibiting
these three types of outcomes can be constructed. These insights regarding
the roles of competition and ownership are consistent with those found in the
previous section.
We end this section with two remarks. Firstly, since inefficient decisions
are made because there is too little competition among sellers, one way to
correct the incentive to allow easy entry into the sellers’ market. By allowing
enough sellers to enter the market, sellers would switch from making general
investments to making specific investments. Secondly, since a reduction in the
number of agents on either side of the market will increase the bargaining power
and affect the sellers’ optimal investments, our results have strong implications
for horizontal integration. A merger among a group of sellers, say, may trigger
a marketwide change in investment decisions. Not only will sellers in the
merged firm change their investment decisions, other sellers will have also
change their investment choices.
6 Extensions
We now look at two variants of the model in order to help sharpen our un-
derstanding. The first variant is one in which a seller is still productive even
if she does not make any investment; the second variant is one in which each
seller chooses the investment level, rather than the investment type. For both
variants, we return to the assumption of |S1| = |B1| and |S3| = |B3|. To
simplify the exposition, we focus on the cases of |S| > |B| and |S| < |B|,
while ignoring the specific case of |S| = |B|. Using the two properties of the
bargaining solution that we have made use of–allocation being in the core
and a Nash equilibrium with outside options as constraints, we are able to
identify in these two extensions equilibria that resemble those found in earlier
Sections.
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6.1 Noninvesting yet Productive Sellers
Let the surplus created by a noninvesting seller and any buyer be the same and
equal to k. The economically interesting case is when k < m− c (in the case
when k ≥ m− c, no seller could ever consider a general investment optimal).
Then it is natural to assume that the surplus jointly created by a buyer and a
seller with a specific investment–but not specific to that buyer–is also k.We
obtain the following properties (the proofs for the following four Propositions
are omitted).
Proposition 5 Suppose |S| > |B|. The following is an equilibrium. |B2| type
2 sellers and all type 3 sellers each make a nonduplicated investment for a type
2 and type 3 buyer, respectively, and receive a price of min{M/2,M − k}. All
type 1 sellers each make a nonduplicated investment for a type 1 buyer and
receive a price of M/2 if k/2 ≤M/2− c and make no investment and receive
a price of k/2 otherwise.
To see this is an equilibrium, first note that, because of core allocation, any
non-investing type 2 seller is willing to sell its zero investment at a price of zero,
giving a surplus of k to the buyer so long as he has the adequate asset(s). This
outside option of k is available for type 2 and type 3 buyers, but not type 1
buyers. Therefore, using Nash equilibrium with outside options as constraints,
we show that type 2 and type 3 buyers receive a price of max{M/2, k} and
type 1 sellers receive a price of M/2 or k/2, depending on the type 1 sellers’
investments. The payoffs to sellers as described in the proposition are then
verified.
Next, we show that the prescribed investments indeed constitute optimal
responses among sellers. Consider a type 2 or type 3 seller who is prescribed
to invest. By unilaterally deviating to a general investment, due to Nash
equilibrium with outside options as constraints, she obtains min{m/2,m −
k}− c , which is lower than her equilibrium payoff of min{M/2,M − k}− c.
By not investing, since the allocation is in the core, she has a payoff of 0, which
is also lower and undesirable. Now we consider the payoff of a type 1 seller.
By choosing a specific investment, a general investment, or no investment,
according to Nash bargaining with outside options as constraints, she obtains
a payoff of M/2 − c, m/2 − c, or k/2, respectively. Hence, a nonduplicated
investment is best when k/2 ≤M/2− c and no investment is best otherwise.
Finally, it suffices to note that those prescribed not to invest will not gain by
investing.
Proposition 6 Suppose |S| < |B|. The following is an equilibrium. All type 1
sellers and type 2 sellers each make a general investment and receive a price of
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m. All type 3 sellers each make a nonduplicated investment for a type 3 buyer
and receive a price of M/2 if k/2 ≤ M/2 − c and each make no investment
and receive a price of k/2 otherwise.
Given the investments as prescribed, the prices are obtained according
to the allocation being in the core and Nash bargaining with outside option
as constraint. By making the general investment, type 1 and type 2 sellers
obtain all the surplus of their general investments through exploiting the excess
competition among type 1 and type 2 buyers. This gives them an even higher
payoff than making a specific investment. Type 3 sellers cannot make use
of the excess competition among buyers, and hence choose the best decision
foreseeing an equal division of surplus. Their optimal decisions are to make
specific investments when k/2 ≤M/2− c but no investment otherwise.
To summarize, when k is small, the predicted investment pattern is just
the same as the case when k = 0. When k is sufficiently large (k/2 ≤M/2−c),
the results are somewhat different, strengthening our results when |S| > |B|
and weakening them when |S| < |B|. We view this case of sufficiently large k
to be rather specific and of limited interest.
6.2 Sellers Choosing Investment Levels
This second extension considers the scenario in which the choice is on the
investment level. In other words, each seller’s decisions are on the level of
a specific investment and for whom the investment is specific. Denote the
investment level as e, and the corresponding cost as c(e), which is increas-
ing, strictly convex, twice differentiable, and satisfies c(0) = 0 and c0(0) = 0.
The surplus that the seller creates together with a buyer (along with a pair
of as and ab) is f(e) if the buyer is the one for whom the investment is spe-
cific, and it is g(e) otherwise. The two functions, f(e) and g(e), have the
following properties: f(0) = g(0) = k ≥ 0, f(e) > g(e) and f 0(e) > g0(e) for
e > 0. Define eFB ≡ argmaxe{f(e)− c(e)}, e∗ ≡ argmaxe{f(e)/2− c(e)}, e=
argmaxe {min{f(e)/2, f(e)− k}− c(e)}, and e = argmaxe{max{f(e)/2, g(e)}−
c(e)}. These investment levels, which we assume are unique, have the following
interpretations. eFB is the first-best investment level; e∗ is the seller’s optimal
investment level foreseeing equal division of the surplus; e is the seller’s opti-
mal investment level foreseeing that the targeted buyer has an outside option
of k; and e is the seller’s optimal investment level foreseeing that she could
sell her investment to a non-targeted buyer at g (e) , where e is her chosen
investment level.
21
Chatterjee and Chiu: When Does Competition Lead to Efficient Investments?
Brought to you by | University of Hong Kong Libraries
Authenticated
Download Date | 11/11/14 10:10 AM
Proposition 7 Suppose |S| > |B|. The following is an equilibrium. All type
1 sellers makes an investment e∗ for some type 1 buyer and receive a payoff
of f(e∗)/2 − c(e∗). |B2| type 2 sellers and all type 3 sellers each make an
investment e for a type 2 and a type 3 buyer respectively and receive a payoff
of min{f(e)/2, f(e)− k}− c(e).
Given the prescribed investments, using the core allocation and Nash bar-
gaining with outside options as constraints, one can easily verify the prices
as described. To show the Proposition, it suffices to show that no seller can
benefit from a unilateral deviation in investments. Choosing a different level of
investment is not optimal, since the prescribed levels, e∗ and e, by definition,
are those that maximize, respectively, type 1’s seller’s payoff f(e)/2 − c(e)
and type 2 or type 3 seller’s payoff min{f(e)/2, f(e) − k} − c(e). Investing
for a different buyer is undesirable as it leads to duplication. Choosing no
investment at all is undesirable too: for type 1 sellers, it means a payoff of
k/2 = f(0)/2− c(0) < f(e∗)/2− c(e∗) (by definition of e∗); for type 2 or type
3 sellers, it means a payoff of zero.
It is interesting to note the relationship between e and e∗. It is straightfor-
ward to verify that e= e∗ when k ≤ f(e∗)/2 and eFB ≥ e > e∗ otherwise. In
other words, when k is small enough, ownership has no effect on investment
and is irrelevant. When k is sufficiently large, on the other hand, sellers with
fewer assets now have a stronger incentive to invest. This illustrates the in-
sight in Chiu and De Meza and Lockwood (1998a) and is consistent with our
results found for the investment type problem.
Proposition 8 Suppose |S| < |B|. The following is an equilibrium. All type
1 and type 2 sellers makes an investment e for some type 1 and type 2 buyer,
respectively, and receive a price of max{f(e)/2, g(e)}. All type 3 sellers each
make an investment e∗ for a type 3 buyer and price a payoff of f(e∗)/2.
When |S| < |B| and buyers are on the long side, type 1 and type 2 sellers
take into account of their outside options with alternative buyers when invest-
ing. Their optimal investment level is given bymax{max{f(e)/2, g(e)} −c(e)}
while that of type 2 sellers, who do not have outside options, is given by
max f {(e)/2− c(e)}. Since e and e∗, by construction, are the optimal choices
for the two problems, the proposition is straightforward and correct.
While the general insight of the proposition is similar to our earlier result
in Section 4, the exact implication regarding efficiency is less conclusive. De-
pending on the relationship between f(e) and g(e), the more endowed type 1
and type 2 sellers may invest more efficiently than their type 3 counterparts.
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In other words, asset ownership may be efficiency enhancing. To see this, sup-
pose that f(e) = k+e and g(e) = k+αe, where −∞ < α < 1.11 For 0 < α < 1,
an investment increases not only the surplus with the targeted buyer but also
the surplus from alternative relationships. For α < 0, the investment is so
specific that it reduces the surplus in any alternative relationship.
By using the following specifications, (i) k = 0 and α > 1/2; (ii) k > 0, 0 <
α < 1/2, and g(e∗) > f(e∗)/2; and (iii) k > 0, α < 0 but k < f(e∗)/2− c(e∗),
we can easily show that (i) eFB > e > e∗, (ii) e < e∗, and (iii) e = e∗, re-
spectively. Of particular interest to us is the first specification, which suggests
a positive role of ownership and is consistent with the GHM framework. It
is important to note that the underlying force for this investment-enhancing
effect of ownership is exactly the same for the investment-weakening effect in
the case of the investment type problem. In both problems, more endowed
sellers attempt to take advantage of the excess competition on the part of
buyers. Here, since α > 0 and this outside option is greater than the equal
division of surplus that will result from Nash bargaining without an outside
option, the sellers invest a greater amount. In the investment type problem,
the sellers choose the inefficient general investment in order to enjoy the excess
competition. This thus suggests the crucial difference between the two kinds
of investment problems.
Although the second specification does show one main thrust of the paper–
the adverse effect of ownership– the effect here does not seem to be as con-
vincing as under the investment type problem. After all, the result here relies
on the property that, in the absence of any investment, not only the seller still
produces a positive surplus but the surplus is also sufficiently large. Interesting
as it may be, this property is a bit unusual and nonstandard.
The third specification, which means that a seller’s outside option decreases
with her own investment, is one of the formulations that Rajan and Zingales
used in arguing for an adverse effect of ownership. Our result does not give
the adverse effect of ownership as in Rajan and Zingales because a different
bargaining solution is used. Under the Shapley value, an agent’s outside op-
tion always enhances one’s payoff from bargaining; under the outside option
principle, an agent’s outside option does not enhance one’s payoff from bar-
gaining until reaching a critical level. Hence, with the standard assumptions
in Hart and Moore, where the outside option increases with investment, the
Shapley value predicts a more positive role to asset ownership in enhancing
11The assumption of linearity of the payoff function in the investment is quite standard
and is without loss of generality; see, for example, Tirole (1999) and Aghion and Tirole
(1997) for similar formulations.
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investment efficiency than the outside option principle does; but under Rajan
and Zingales, where the outside option decreases with investment, it predicts
a more negative role to asset ownership.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper has demonstrated the joint effects of ownership and market com-
petition in determining investment decisions. A seller can improve her payoff
through two means: to make herself the monopolist of the product for her tar-
geted buyer and to generate competition among alternative buyers. When the
choice is between general or specific investment, the first means is achieved
by choosing the specific investment and the second by choosing the general
investment. The trade-off between the two means, or between the two invest-
ment types, is resolved as a function of the market structure, characterized by
the numbers of sellers and buyers as well as by what assets they own.12
When the choice variable is the investment level, the trade-off between the
two means no longer exists. Both means are fulfilled by the choice of the same
specific investment. Although the benefit from the first means – to become
a monopolist – is constrained by the availability of the targeted partner, a
seller may enhance her payoff if she can make use of the second means to
enhance her outside option. Hence, when there are fewer sellers than buyers,
the second means may motivate sellers who own more assets to choose higher,
more appropriate investment levels.
Our result of the harmful effect of ownership generalizes related results
in Chiu, de Meza and Lockwood, and Rajan and Zingales in an important
dimension. In those papers, the outside market was assumed to be fixed,
independent of the conceived parties. The emphasis was usually on the in-
vestment incentives of both parties in a bilateral relationship. That is, the
strategic relationship was among parties who would trade/cooperate ex post.
While allowing for a multilateral relationship in which several agents work in a
single firm, Rajan and Zingales still retain the feature that these agents know
ex ante that they will cooperate ex post. This is not the case here. Here, all
investors will never benefit from working together as a firm, and the strategic
interactions occur indirectly through the market.
Our basic model can be embedded into more elaborate environments. One
extension is to allow for buyers’ investments, in addition to sellers’ invest-
12The above two motives are independently pointed out in a paper by Nicita (1999), who
calls the scenario in which sellers face multiple buyers and have multiple investment choices
“cross competition.”
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ments. If buyers make investments subsequent to bargaining, then clearly the
investments made will be constrained efficient and there will be little change
to our basic results. Another extension is to relax the “unit trade” assumption
where an investment can be used by no more than one buyer. In this case,
sellers will have an extra incentive to make general investments. We think
that, even if the exact condition will be different, the insights that stronger
competition makes it more likely for sellers to make specific investment and
that loss of ownership makes sellers more likely to invest in specific invest-
ments will still hold. The third extension would be to take into account the
welfare of consumers who subsequently purchase from downstream producers
(the buyers in our model). This will endogenize the joint surplus of each type
of investment. While adding a dose of realism to our model, this will blur
the prediction because of the externality of investments on consumers. While
the roles of competition and ownership in determining the investment choices
should still prevail, the normative analysis may vary drastically. Perhaps be-
cause of this, in the property rights and incomplete contracting literature,
consumers’ welfare is usually ignored, just as we have done in this paper. The
fourth extension is to allow sellers to choose both the level of general invest-
ment and the level of specific investment. We conjecture that results similar
to those found in this paper will prevail in this more general model.
Appendix A: Sketch of the Proof of Lemma 1.
Here we consider the case of E1; the proofs for the cases of E2 and E3 are
similar. Since efficient allocation of duplicated and nonduplicated investments
can be routinely conducted, we focus on general investment here. Consider
the following algorithm. (i) Assign the general investments of sellers in Si1 to
Bi1, i = 1, 2, 3. (ii) In case of unfulfilled demand by any buyer in B
3
1 , assign
the buyer an allocated general investment in S21 . (iii) If still there is unfulfilled
demand by any buyer in B31 or B
2
1 , assign the buyer an unallocated general
investment in S11 . Then the final allocation is efficient, and more importantly
we can show that the number of unallocated general investment in S11 equals
E1 if E1 is positive and equals 0 otherwise.
Case 1. E1 > 0. According to above algorithm, an efficient allocation
is resulted in which E1 sellers in S11 do not have their investments allocated
while all buyers in ∪iBi1 obtain general investments. Since in any other efficient
allocation the same total production value is resulted, all buyers in ∪iBi1 must
obtain general investments while some seller in ∪jSj1 must have her investment
unallocated.
Case 2: E1 = 0. According to the algorithm, no general investments in
S11 are left unallocated. It is straightforward to show that all buyers in ∪iBi1
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obtain general investments in this efficient allocation (call it φ1). The same
must hold in any other efficient allocation. We now show that all sellers in S11
have their general investments allocated in any other efficient allocation (call
it φ2). Suppose, on the contrary, some seller in S
1
1 has her general investment
unallocated under φ2. Since the same number of buyers who obtain general
investments under φ2 is the same under φ1, a seller in S
2
1 ∪S31 with her general
investment unallocated under φ1 has it allocated under φ2. For this seller
to be in S21 , it must be that ∆
2 > 0 (otherwise, according to the algorithm,
her investment would be assigned to some buyer under φ1 according to the
algorithm). But if ∆2 > 0, for E1 = 0 and ∆1 ≥ 0 to hold, it must be the
case that ∆3 is negative and has an absolute value no less than that of ∆2.
Thus according to the algorithm, the putative seller in ∆2 would have her
investment allocated under φ1. A contradiction. If that seller is in S
3
1 , then
it must be that ∆3 > 0 (otherwise, her investment would be assigned to some
buyer under φ1 according to the algorithm). Since E
1 = 0 and ∆1 ≥ 0, this
implies ∆1 +∆2 = 0, i.e., all buyers’ demand in B11 and B
2
1 are satisfied–as
is the case under φ2–only if all sellers in S
1
1 and S
2
1 have all their investments
allocated under φ2. This is contradictory to the claim that under φ2 some
seller in S11 has her investment unallocated.
Case 3: E1 < 0. According to the algorithm, no general investment in S11 is
left unallocated, it can also be verified the number of buyers in ∪iBi1 who do not
obtain a general investment is |E1|. Then there must be some buyer in ∪jBj1
without general investment for any efficient allocation, because the number of
buyers who obtain general investments under that efficient allocation must be
the same as under φ1. What is left to show is under any arbitrarily different
efficient allocation, no general investment in S11 is left unallocated. But this
must be the case since there are buyers without general investments who want
to match with any such sellers.
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 2.
The first part of the proposition is easy to prove. Result (a) of the second
part is trivial. We now show result (b), and proofs of the rest are similar.
Suppose the result in (b) is not true, and there exists an allocation in the core
such that some seller in Si1 (say s
0) successfully sells its general investment at
p > 0. Note that Ei > 0 implies excess supply of general investments to Bi1.
Somebody’s (say, s00) general investment would be redundant. Now consider a
subcoalition which includes every agent but s0. The worth of this subcoalition
would be the same as the grand coalition, denoted by v. The reason is that
the general investment sold by s0 is now replaced by that of s00 and becomes
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reductant. As the initial allocation assigns a sum of payoffs to members of the
subcoalition of v − p < v, the subcoalition can then profit by breaking away.
It is thus contradictory to the claim that the original allocation is in the core.
Appendix C: A Sketch of Proof of the Bargaining Solution as a Sub-
game Perfect Equilibrium Outcome of an Alternating Offer Game.
Proposition A.1. There exists a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome, which
is reached immediately without delay and which approaches our bargain-
ing solution as δ approaches unity.
Before we describe the equilibrium strategy, some notation is in order. Let
Eit be the Ei prevailed in substage t, and Sitj (B
it
j ) be the corresponding S
i
j
(Bij) still in the market at the beginning of substage t, i = 1, 2, 3, j = 1, 2, 3.
Let sitjk (b
it
jk) be the kth seller in S
it
j (kth buyer in B
it
j ), i = 1, 2, 3, j = 1, 2, 3.
In an order-preserving manner, identify each player unambiguously so as to
keep check of the transition from substage t to substage t+ 1. (For instance,
if the kth seller in Sitj survives in stage t+ 1 but all sellers with ranks smaller
than kth do not, then call this surviving seller as the first seller in Si,t+1j .)
We first define two sets of prices epij and pij, i = 1, 2, 3, j = 1, 2, 3 as follows
(superscript t is omitted):
Prices proposed by sellers in Sij
Ei > 0
Ei = 0
Ei < 0
epi1 epi2 epi3
0 min{M −m,M/(1 + δ)} 0
m/(1 + δ) M/(1 + δ) 0
m M/(1 + δ) 0
Prices proposed by buyers in Bij
Ei > 0
Ei = 0
Ei < 0
pi1 p
i
2 p
i
3
0 min{M −m,M/(1 + δ)} 0
δm/(1 + δ) δM/(1 + δ) 0
m δM/(1 + δ) 0
Table A1
The on-the-equilibrium-path strategy prescription is as follows. P1a (1 and
2) describes what each player does when being a proposer, and P1b (3 to 10)
describes what each player does when being a responder after P1a has just
been played. (To abuse the notation a little bit, we ignore the superscript t in
the following description.)
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1. When sellers propose, sijk publicly proposes to sell his investment to
anybody at epij, k = 1, 2, .., |Sij|; i = 1, 2, 3; j = 1, 2, 3.
2. When buyers propose, bijk proposes p
i
j for any general investment (for
j = 1) and for the investment specific to himself (for j = 2, 3), k =
1, 2, .., |Bij|; i = 1, 2, 3; j = 1, 2, 3.
3. bi2k accepts to buy from the seller who has a specific investment for
him where k = 1, 2, 3, ..., and i = 1, 2, 3. Buyer bi3k accept to buy with
equal probability from the sellers who have duplicate specific investments
where k = 1, 2, 3, ..., and i = 1, 2, 3.
4. b11k first accepts to buy from sellers in S
1
1 in order (i.e., b
1
1k buying from
s11k in S
1
1 , etc.), k = 1, 2, .... If |S11 | < |B11 |, excess buyers each (k =
|S11 |+ 1, |S11 |+ 2, ...) accept to buy from sellers in S11 independently and
randomly with equal probability.
5. b21k first accepts to buy from sellers in S
2
1 in order, k = 1, 2, ..... If
|S21 | < |B21 |, excess buyers each (k = |S21 |+1, |S11 |+2, ...) accept to buy in
order from sellers in S11 whose offers are not accepted as prescribed by (4).
The remaining excess buyers accept to buy independently and randomly
with equal probability from all sellers whose offers are supposed to be
accepted as prescribed above by (5).
6. In the same manner as (4) and (5), b31k first accept to buy from sellers in
S31 in order, k = 1, 2, .... The excess buyers accept to buy in order from
sellers in S21 whose offers are not accepted as prescribed in (4) and (5).
The remaining buyers accept to buy in order from sellers in S11 whose of-
fers are not accepted as prescribed by (4) and (5). The further remaining
buyers accept to buy independently and randomly with equal probabil-
ity from sellers whose offers are supposed to be accepted as prescribed
above by (6).
7. sijk accepts to sell to the buyer for whom the seller has a specific invest-
ment where k = 1, 2, 3, ..., j = 2, 3, and i = 1, 2, 3.
8. s31k accepts to sell to buyers in B
3
1 in order (i.e., s
3
1k sells to b
3
1k in B
3
1 ,
etc.), k = 1, 2, .... If |S31 | > |B31 |, excess sellers (k = |B31 |+1, |B31 |+2, ...)
accept to sell to all buyers in B31 independently and randomly with equal
probability.
9. s21k first accepts to sell to buyers in B
2
1 in order, k = 1, 2, ..... If |S21 | >
|B21 |, excess sellers (k = |S21 |+1, |S21 |+2, ...) each accept to sell in order
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to buyers in B11 whose offers are not accepted as prescribed by (8). The
remaining excess sellers accept to sell independently and randomly with
equal probability to all buyers whose offers are supposed to be accepted
as prescribed above by (9).
10. In the same manner as (8) and (9), s11k first accepts to sell to buyers in
B11 in order, k = 1, 2, 3, .... The excess sellers accept to sell in order to
B21 whose offers are not accepted as prescribed by (9). The remaining
sellers accept to sell in order to B31 whose offers are not accepted as
prescribed by (8) and (9). The further remaining sellers then accept
to sell randomly and independently with equal probability to all buyers
whose offers are supposed to be accepted as prescribed above by (10).
It is straightforward to verify the following two lemmas.
Lemma A.2. Given P1a and P1b are played in stage t, then Ei,t R 0 ⇒
Ei,t+1 R 0.
Lemma A.3. Given P1a and P1b are to be played in stage t and thereafter,
the game will end immediately with prices as stipulated in Table A1.
It is a bit tedious to verify that off the equilibrium path strategies can be
constructed in such a way that, while they are best responses, no one can gain
by unilateral deviations from P1a or P1b.
Lemma A.4. Given that P1 is played in stages after t, there does not exist a
beneficial unilateral deviation from P1a or from P1b.
Given Lemmas A2 to A4, Proposition A.1 is immediate. In order to prove
that P1a and P1b will be played hereafter, one must show that beneficial
unilateral deviations are impossible, (i) when simultaneously all other players
follow P1a, and (ii) when simultaneously all other players follow P1b. Case
(ii) is easiest to see and is apparent from Lemma A.3. For case (i), we should
consider two types of deviations: less aggressive and more aggressive. A less
aggressive deviation is one in which upon accepting the offer the payoff to the
deviator is less than what P1a and P1b allow him (hence, a lower (greater)
asking price when the deviator is a seller (buyer)). A more-aggressive deviation
is just the opposite of a less aggressive deviation. It refers to an asking price
greater (lower) than the deviator’s asking price as prescribed by P1a when
the deviator is a seller (buyer). That a less aggressive deviation can never be
beneficial can be shown easily. Basically, the deviation can be beneficial only
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when the offer is not accepted, and in the next stage the competition becomes
more favorable to the deviator so that he or she can obtain a greater payoff
even after discounting. This can be shown to be impossible, for it will happen
only if somebody else makes a strictly dominated decision in stage t.
To show that a more aggressive deviation can never be beneficial, one needs
to stipulate the response strategy prescription–which we call P2–to any of
such unilateral deviations from P1a. P2 is basically the same as P1b, except
for the responder who is supposed to accept the deviator’s candidate equi-
librium proposal prescribed by P1b. Depending on the case, that responder
is prescribed either to reject any offer or to accept some other offer. By so
doing, this ensures that, if the responder survives the next stage, he will see
a competition environment similar to the one in the last stage (Ei,t+1 = Ei,t).
In this case his payoff from stage t + 1 (given that P1a and P1b are to be
played) will be definitely greater than that from accepting the deviating offer
in stage t. The last thing to show is that no unilateral deviations from P2 will
be beneficial given that P1a and P1b are to be played hereafter. This again is
indeed true. All of the above altogether shows Proposition A.1.
Appendix D. Proof of Proposition 2
This is equivalent to showing that in every equilibrium Ei = 0 for all i.
Suppose otherwise Ek 6= 0 for some k; according to Lemma 2, we have Ek < 0.
Using the definition of Ek, it must be the case that ∆l < 0 for some l. Since¯
Sl
¯
≥
¯
Bl
¯
,
¯
Sl
¯
=
P4
j=0
¯
Slj
¯
,and
¯
Bl
¯
=
P3
j=1
¯
Blj
¯
, we have
4X
j=0
¯
Slj
¯
≥
3X
j=1
¯
Blj
¯
,
implying ¯
Sl0
¯
+
¯
Sl1
¯
+
¯
Sl2
¯
≥
¯
Bl1
¯
+
¯
Bl2
¯
after taking into account of part 1 of Lemma 2. With some manipulation, we
have
∆l ≥
¯
Bl2
¯
−
¯
Sl0
¯
−
¯
Sl2
¯
.
Therefore the fact that∆l < 0 implies that either
¯
Sl0
¯
or
¯
Sl2
¯
must be positive.
We now argue that, given that Ek is negative, any member in Sl0 could have
improved her payoff by making a general investment, and likewise any member
in Sl2 could have improved her payoff by switching to a general investment.
In the former case, both ∆l and Ek are increased by one as a result of the
unilateral deviation. If the new Ek is still negative, the deviating seller will
receive a price of m; if it is now zero, she will receive a price of m/2. Either
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case, the deviation is strictly beneficial. In the latter case, since there is no
change to ∆l and El as a result of the deviation, the deviating seller will
certainly obtain a price of m > M/2. But there should not be unilateral
beneficial deviation in an equilibrium. A contradiction. Hence it must be true
that Ei = 0 for all i.
Appendix E. Proof of Proposition 3. (where |S| < |B|)
We first note that in any equilibrium of the game, it must be true that
E3 = 0, whose proof is similar to the one in Proposition 2 and is omitted here.
Note that E3 = 0 implies ∆3 = 0. Together they imply that S3 = S32 , i.e.,
every seller in S3 chooses a nonduplicate investment for some buyer in B3. We
next argue that E1 < 0 and E2 < 0. Recall a few relationships:¯
S12
¯
+
¯
S22
¯
+
¯
S32
¯
=
¯
B12
¯
+
¯
B22
¯
+
¯
B32
¯¯
S10
¯
+
¯
S11
¯
+
¯
S12
¯
=
¯
B11
¯
+
¯
B12
¯¯
S20
¯
+
¯
S21
¯
+
¯
S22
¯
<
¯
B21
¯
+
¯
B22
¯
where the first equation is a restatement of (1), the second and third equations
are statements of |S1| = |B1| and |S2| < |B2|, respectively (after taking into
part 1 of Lemma 2). Using the last two equations, we have
∆1 +∆2 <
¡¯
B12
¯
+
¯
B22
¯¢
−
¡¯
S12
¯
+
¯
S22
¯¢
−
¡¯
S10
¯
+
¯
S20
¯¢
=
¯
S32
¯
−
¯
B32
¯
−
¡¯
S10
¯
+
¯
S20
¯¢
( ∵ the first equation)
Since |S32 | = |B32 | (every seller in S3 makes a nonduplicate investment for
some buyer in B3), we have ∆1 + ∆2 must be negative, implying also that
either ∆1 or ∆2 or both are negative. Coupled with ∆3 = 0, this implies that
E1 = ∆1+min{0,∆2} < 0. The negativity of E1 implies that all sellers in S1
would choose a general investment, leading to ∆1 = 0. As a consequence ∆2
is negative and so is E2. Given E2 < 0, all sellers in S2 will choose general
investments. And this completes the proof.
Appendix F. Proof of Proposition 4
(1) We show this by contradiction. Suppose two sellers in Si, s1 and s2,
make a general and specific investment, respectively. Given the investment
choices of all other sellers, we can determine that one of the following must be
true: (i) Ei > 0, (ii) Ei = 0, and (iii) Ei < 0. If (i) is the case, then s1, who
made a general investment will get a zero payoff in ex post bargaining. She
of course could have done better. A contradiction. If (ii) is the case, then s1
and s2 sell at a price of m/2 and M/2, respectively. Foreseeing this, s1 should
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have switched to make a specific investment for the one who is supposed to
purchase the general investment from her in the punitive equilibrium. In this
case, it can be checked that Ei will remain the same, and s1 will then receive
M/2, rather than m/2. A contradiction. If (iii) is the case, s1 and s2 receive
m and M/2 respectively. Foreseeing this, s2 should have switched to make a
general investment to receive a payment of m, rather than M/2 (with such a
switch, Ei will remain to be negative). Hence, a contradiction.
(2) Suppose some si in Si makes a specific investment but some si+1 in Si+1
makes a general investment. Clearly, with such a specific investment, si must
be facing a situation where Ei ≥ 0. Otherwise (i.e., Ei < 0), si should have
switched to a general investment to obtain a payment of m, which is greater
than M/2, her payoff from a specific investment. Note that such a switch of
investment does not alter the value of Ei > 0. It is thus a contradiction. There
are now two subcases to consider. Either (i) Ei > 0 or (ii) E i = 0. In the
former case, from Remark 3, Ei+1 ≥ Ei > 0, si+1’s equilibrium selling price
of her general investment would be zero, and she cannot even get back her
investment cost. This clearly is contradictory. In the latter case, if Ei+1 >
Ei = 0, then the aforementioned contradiction still occurs. If Ei+1 = 0, then
seller si+1’s gross gain is m/2 from a general investment. But foreseeing this,
she should have switched to a specific investment, whereby Ei+1 will remain
the same, and she can obtain a greater gross gain of M/2. A contradiction.
(3)We first show that ei ≥ 0 implies that every investing seller in Si chooses
a nonduplicate specific investment. Consider the case where i = 3. Suppose,
by contrary, that in equilibrium some seller in S3 chooses a general investment.
Equilibrium condition entails that all investing sellers (in all Si) must make
general investment. The fact that investing sellers in S3 choose a general
investment also implies that E3 < 0, in turn implying ∆3 < 0. It is easy to
see that no seller in Si will be noninvesting (otherwise, such a noninvesting
seller would have benefitted from a unilateral deviation to a general investment
for sale to some buyer in B31 who does not get any investment). As a result,
∆i ≡ |Si1|− |Bi1| = |Si|− |Bi| ≡ di for all i and E3 = e3 ≥ 0, contradictory to
the earlier claim that E3 < 0.
The same argument works for the case where i = 2. Suppose e2 ≥ 0 but,
by contrary, in equilibrium some seller in S2 chooses a general investment.
Then equilibrium conditions entail that all investing sellers in S1 and S2 make
general investment. The fact that investing sellers in S2 choose a general
investment also implies that E2 < 0 so that a general investment is sold at m.
Then every seller in S1 and S2 invests (otherwise, such a noninvesting seller
would have benefitted from a unilateral deviation to a general investment for
sale to some buyer in B21 ∪B31 who does not get any investment). As a result,
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∆i ≡ |Si1|− |Bi1| = |Si|− |Bi| ≡ di for i = 1, 2. Therefore e2 and E2 differ in
their last terms, and we argue that through clarifying the relationship of these
last terms we establish that E2 = e2 which is a contradiction. To see this,
suppose some general investment by S1 and S2 is sold to some buyer in B3 in
equilibrium. Since the price is m, it must be the case that E3 < 0 and every
investment seller in S3 must choose general investment and every seller in S3
invests (in case of a noninvesting seller, she can choose specific investment
and benefit from such a deviation). Hence, ∆3 = |S31 |− |B31 | = |S3|− |B3| ≡
d3 and E2 = e2. On the other hand, suppose no general investment by S1
and S2 is sold to any buyer in B3 in equilibrium. This occurs only when
max{0, d1} + d2 = 0 and d3 ≥ 0 (using the definition of e2 and the fact that
it is not negative). Since no investment from S1 ∪ S2 will be sold to buyers
in B3, it follows that ∆3 = 0 = min{0, d3} and E2 ≡ e2. Hence, either case,
there is a contradiction.
Suppose e1 ≥ 0 but, by contrary, in equilibrium some seller in S1 chooses a
general investment. Then equilibrium conditions entail that all investing sellers
in S1 make general investment. The fact that investing sellers in S1 choose
a general investment also implies that E1 < 0 so that a general investment
is sold at m. Then every seller in S1 invests (otherwise, such a noninvesting
seller would have benefitted from a unilateral deviation to a general investment
for sale to some buyer who does not get any investment). As a result, ∆1 ≡
|S11 | − |B11 | = |S1| − |B1| ≡ d1. Suppose some general investment by S1 is
sold to some buyer in B2 ∪B3 in equilibrium. Since the price is m, it must be
the case that Ei < 0 for some i = 2, 3 and every investment seller in Si must
choose general investment. This contradicts the fact that since ei ≥ e1 ≥ 0
sellers in Si should make specific investments. Suppose, on the other hand, no
general investment by Si is sold to any buyer in B2 ∪B3 in equilibrium. This
occurs only when ∆1 = 0 and either ∆2 or ∆2 or both are negative (using the
definition of E1 < 0 and that ∆1 = d1 is nonnegative given e1 ≥ 0). As a
consequence E2 = E1 < 0, in which case sellers in S2 should choose general
investments, contradicting that under e2 ≥ 0 (which is the case) sellers in
S2 should make specific investments. In other words, either case, there is a
contradiction.
(4) We now show that ei < 0 implies that every investing seller in Si
chooses a general investment. We start with the case where i = 1. Suppose
e1 < 0 but, by contrary, in equilibrium some seller in S1 chooses a specific
investment. To be an equilibrium, it must be the case that every investing
seller in S1, S2 or S3 choose specific investment and Ei = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3,
implying ∆i = 0 and |Bi1| = |Si1|−∆i = 0 for i = 1, 2, 3. In other words, every
buyer in Bi has a nonduplicate specific investment made for him, implying
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d1 ≥ 0, d1 + d2 ≥ 0, and d1 + d2 + d3 ≥ 0. Since d1 is positive, e1 < 0 requires
that d2 +min{0, d3} < 0 and hence e1 = d1 + d2 +min{0, d3}. If d3 ≥ 0, then
e1 = d1 + d2 ≥ 0; if d2 < 0, then e1 = d1 + d2 + d3 ≥ 0. Either case, it is a
contradiction to the hypothesis e1 < 0.
We next show the case for i = 2. Suppose e2 < 0. We first note that
all investing sellers in S1 chooses general investment since e1 ≤ e2 < 0 and
we have proved that the investment decisions for this case in the preceding
paragraph. In addition, E1 < 0 and there are no non-investing sellers in S1.
Recall our hypothesis that e2 < 0, which implies d2 + min{0, d3} < 0. As
a result ∆1 = d1. If d1 > 0, some general investment in S1 is sold to some
buyer in B2 or B3, leading to either E2 < 0 or E3 < 0, both implying that
investing sellers in S2 make only general investments. If d1 ≤ 0, some seller
in S2 chooses a specific investment. To be an equilibrium, it must imply that
all investing sellers in S2 and S3 make specific investment and E2 = E3 = 0,
implying ∆2 = ∆3 = 0. Since no sellers in S2 and S3 have made general
investments, |Bi1| = |Si1| − ∆i = 0, i = 2, 3. That is, every buyer in S2 and
S3 has a nonduplicate specific investment made for him, i.e., d2 ≥ 0 and
d2+ d3 ≥ 0, implying that d2+min{0, d3} ≥ 0. But this is in contradiction to
the hypothesis that e2 < 0 which implies d2 +min{0, d3} < 0.
Finally, we come to the case where i = 3. Suppose e3 < 0. Since e1 ≤
e2 ≤ e3, we have shown that all investing sellers in S1 and S2 make general
investments. In addition E1 = E2 < 0, each general investment is sold at a
price of m, and there are no non-investing sellers in S1 and S2. This implies
that ∆i ≡ |Si1| − |Bi1| = |Si| − |Bi| ≡ di, for i = 1, 2. Consider ∆3. Since no
specific investments will be supplied from S1 ∪ S2, we have |S32 | = |B32 | and
therefore ∆3 ≡ |S31 |− |B31 | = (|S31 |+ |S32 |)− (|B31 |+ |B32 |) ≤ |S3|− |B3| = d3.
Therefore, E3 ≤ e3 < 0, and investing sellers in S3 should indeed choose
general investments. This completes the whole proof.
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